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Ross, Hardies, O'Keefe, Babcock & Parsons, Chicago, Ill.
(1979-81); Law Clerk, Judge Wilbur F. Pell, Jr., U.S. Ct.
Appeals, 7th Circuit, 1981-82; Assistant Professor since
1983.
On January 30, 1984, the Arkansas Supreme
Court acknowledged that it had "inadvertently
failed to recognize the new concept of ' marital property' " created by a 1979 Arkansas statute, and
awarded to Sarah Day one half of her ex-husband's
interest in his employer-sponsored retirement plan.
The scenario which led to this decision in Day v.
Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984), is
certainly not unique. Dr. Stephen Martin Day and
Sarah Shinault Day were married for twenty-nine
years and had six children. The only contested issue
when Sarah Day brought suit for a divorce was the
division ofthe marital property. The divorce decree
directed the husband to pay alimony for twentyfour months and child support for the only remaining minor child, with all other property to be divided equally between the parties. Included within
this equal division of property was Stephen Day's
interest in a retirement plan sponsored by his employer, the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville.
Under an act passed in 1979 governing the division of marital property, all "marital property" is
subject to equitable distribution upon divorce.
"Marital property" is dermed simply as "all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the
marriage," subject to certain limited exceptions: (1)
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage or in exchange
for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (3) property acquired by a spouse after a
decree of divorce from bed and board; (4) property
excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and (5)
any increase in value of property acquired prior to
the marriage. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214 (Supp.
1983). The Court found, as the parties acknowl-

edged, that none of the designated exceptions were
applicable to Dr. Day's retirement accounts.
Dr. Day's retirement plan consisted of two annuity contracts - a guaranteed deferred annuity
contract (administered by the Teachers' Insurance
Annuity Association) and a variable annuity plan
(the College Retirement Equities Fund), known collectively as the "TIAA-CREF" plan. Dr. Day participated in the plan by making monthly contributions of 10% of his salary which the University
matched in equal contributions. Earnings on the
pension funds' investments would be credited to his
account. His interest in the plan was "vested" only
in the sense that it could not be diminished unilaterally by the University and was not dependent
on his continued employment by the University. He
was not entitled to payments at the time of the
decree, so the interest was not "vested" in that
sense. He could have elected to receive his periodic
benefits at any time but had not done so at the time
of the decree. Moreover, he could not withdraw or
transfer the funds to his credit, those funds having
no loan or surrender value, and he could not receive
his benefits in a lump sum. Sarah Day had been
awarded half of the accumulated value of his interest in the plan, to be awarded to her when Dr.
Day should elect to receive payments. Any contributions made by Dr. Day after the date of the divorce decree would accrue only to his benefit.
In several Arkansas Supreme Court cases decided under an earlier version of the property settlement statute and under the 1979 act, the Court
had concluded that similar benefits were not property subject to equitable distribution upon divorce
because they were dependent on future contingencies or not yet due and payable. Under an earlier
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dren and bringing them up.
To buttress its conclusion, the Court quoted with
approval the California Supreme Court decision in
Re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 126 Cal.Rptr.
633,544 P.2d 561, 94 A.L.R.3d 164 (1976), a decision defining community property. In refusing to
find "controlling differences" between pensions
"vested" and currently payable and those "vested"
but payable in the future, the Arkansas Supreme
Court was apparently using the term ''vested'' in
the sense used in Brown - that the pension benefits could not be unilaterally terminated by the
employer without terminating the employment relationship:
Having concluded that Dr. Day's pension rights
were property, the Court went one step further to
determine that the pension created rights which
were subject to division as marital property, rather
than merely factors to be considered in the award
of alimony. If the pension benefits had been viewed
only as factors militating in favor of increased alimony, Stephen Day would have been obliged to
pay alimony in an amount commensurate with income he was not actually receiving. Then Sarah
Day would not have been able to retain the option
of allowing the benefits awarded to her to continue
to accumulate in the fund on a tax deferred basis.
The Court was unwilling to reach that result in the
circumstances of the case. However, the Court cautioned that it was not setting forth an inflexible
rule, and left the characterization of other deferred
benefit plans to future cases. 1
Will the Day case, then, lead to the classification
of social security benefits, insurance benefits, and
military pensions as "marital property?" The dissent suggests so. The distinguishing features of the
TIAA-CREF accounts were that they were: (1) purchased with marital funds; (2) vested from termination by the employer without termination of the
employment relationship; (3) subject to election to
receive benefits at any time; (4) had a current, ascertainable value, and (5) could be divided easily
and equitably. In future cases, any deviations in
benefit plans from these characteristics could be
used by the Court to refuse division of the plan as
marital property.
For example, military retirement pay bears certain similarities to ordinary pension plans for periodic benefits to be dispensed upon retirement but
subject to divestment upon prior death or discharge. On the other hand, military retirement pay
at no time has any cash surrender, loan, redemption or lump sum value and, more importantly, pensions may be eliminated or reduced by the government. The division of insurance benefits as marital
property would be entirely dependent on the nature

version of the statute (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214
(Repl. 1962», the Court had found that fully vested
railroad retirement benefits not yet due and payable (Knopfv. Knopf, 264 Ark. 946, 576 S.W.2d 193
(1979» and military retirement pay not yet due and
payable (Fenney v. Fenney, 259 Ark. 858, 537
S.W.2d 367 (1970» were not property subject to
distribution. Under the 1979 act, the Court had
refused to fmd a military pension being paid but
non-transferable to be marital property (Paulsen v.
Paulsen, 269 Ark. 523, 601 S.W.2d 873 (1980». Similarly, in other divorce cases, the Court had rejected
property claims to company retirement benefits
(Sweeney v. Sweeney, 267 Ark. 595,593 S.W.2d 21
(1980», a capital account not fully distributable
(Hachett u. Hachett, 278 Ark. 82, 643 S.W.2d 560
(1982», see also Russell v. Russell, 275 Ark. 193,
628 S.W.2d 315 (1982), and an IRA account notfully
distributable (Potter u. Potter, 280 Ark. 38, 655
S.W.2d 382 (1983)). In contrast, however, the Court
had held that a profit-sharing trust subject to the
employee's withdrawal was marital property
(Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23,621 S.W.2d
701 (1981».
What, then, led the Court to conclude that Dr.
Day's retirement benefits were marital property,
prompting Justice Hickman to remark in dissent
that he assumed the "traditional approach" of
Hackett> Russell, Bachman> Paulsen, Sweeney, and
Knopf was overruled? The Court concluded:
Under the recent holdings of the Supreme
Court, spouses must be treated equally in the
absence of a valid reason for making a distinction. Our 1979 law was enacted pursuant
to that mandate and must be construed in
harmony with that intent. It is easy to demonstrate that the legislative purpose will be
frustrated if controlling differences are drawn
between pensions vested and currently payable and those that are vested but payable in
the future. If, for example, Dr. Day had made
a monthly deposit in a savings account for 20
years, that money would be marital property
in a divorce case. The same rule would apply
if, a year before the divorce, he had in good
faith decided to invest the money in an annuity payable upon his future retirement. His
interest in the annuity would also be marital
property. That in substance is the situation in
this case: Dr. Day has used part of the family's
money to buy the annuities he now seeks to
exempt from their proper classification as
marital property. Under the law, however, we
must recognize that Mrs. Day also contributed
to the acquisition of the annuities by service
as a homemaker and by bearing the six chil-
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FOOTNOTES

of the plan, with the inascertainable current value
and dependency on future contingencies inherent
in most plans militating against equitable division
as marital property, although the present cash surrender value and paid-in cash premiums of some
insurance plans may be considered in the property
settlement. Social Security benefits as a form of
social insurance differ in several respects from ordinary pension plans subject to division as marital
property: inter alia, the amount of an employee's
contributions does not necessarily determine the
amount of benefits received, the amount of benefits
is subject to adjustment based upon future conduct
having nothing to do with contributions or past labor, and the family portion of benefits is predicated
upon the status of the recipient of the benefits
rather than the covered worker's contributions (see,
e.g., In Re Marriage of Kelley, 64 Cal. App.3d 82,
134 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1976)).
The Pandora's box which the dissent projects,
therefore, may be one that is easily manageable
within the criteria of the Day case and those of
other jurisdictions which also have embarked along
this same route. 2 The dissent might view as even
more troublesome another potential form of "marital property" the Arkansas Supreme Court has yet
to address - the professional degree in a marriage
in which there are no other appreciable assets.
When there are appreciable assets during a marriage, a spouse's financial contributions toward the
other spouse's degree may be considered in division
of the assets, yet when the only marital asset is a
degree in the name of one spouse who has been ,
supported during the earning of the degree by the
other spouse, traditional concepts of property may
preclude an equitable remedy. In such circumstances, courts frequently will consider the professional
spouse's future earning capacity or the contributing
spouse's contributions as "breadwinner" in determining the property settlement or alimony. Does
such an approach assure the contributing spouse a
fair return on his or her investment in the degree?
What should be done if the statute precludes alimony to a spouse capable of self-support? As can
be seen from these questions, the Arkansas Supreme Court has taken only a preliminary step in
Day toward defining property to assure equal treatment of spouses upon divorce.

The author would like to thank Terry Kirkpatrick, counsel for
Sarah Shinault Day, for her cooperation in the preparation of
this commentary.
1 Dr. Day also urged for reversal based upon the purported
negative tax consequences to hlm of the decree, but he had failed
to preserve or develop the issue below. The Court did, however,
amend the decree to reserve jurisdiction for any tax problems
that might arise.
2 Valuation of pension rights is also a manageable task. The
approach of the courts has been: (1) to award the spouse a portion of the employee's contributions to the fund; (2) calculate
the present value of the benefits payable in the future, dis·
counted to present value by the amount of interest to be earned
in the future, by the probability that the employee will die before
qualifying for full rights or by any other condition whlch might
disqualify the employee; or (3) to determine a flXed percentage
for the nonemployee spouse of any future payments the employee receives as was done in Day.
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